



**UNODC**

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

# Governing Safer Cities: Strategies for a Globalised World



**A Framework to Guide  
Urban Policy-Makers and Practitioners**

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **The city safety debate re-energised**

The security challenges of individual cities are increasingly a result of the intersection between local vulnerabilities and illicit flows from across national borders. States as a whole are affected by the destabilising effects of these flows of illicit commodities and the associated challenges of organised crime, corruption and terrorism. These phenomena are undercutting good governance and the rule of law, threatening security, development and peoples' life chances. But with two-thirds of the current world population expected to reside in cities by 2030, these challenges are and will continue to be particularly acute in cities across the globe. As the UNODC Global Study on Homicide (2011 and 2013) has shown, many urban areas have higher rates of homicide – a useful proxy for levels of violence more generally – than the national average; cities being the source of both greater levels of risk as well as opportunities for crime prevention and responses.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Goal 16) recognises that reducing conflict, crime, violence, discrimination, and ensuring the rule of law, inclusion and good governance, are key elements of people's well-being and essential for securing sustainable development. The 2030 Agenda also explicitly highlights the promotion of safe, inclusive and resilient cities (Goal 11). This must be achieved through equitable development, safeguarded by fair, humane and effective crime prevention and criminal justice systems as a central component of the rule of law.

The Sustainable Development Goals and the New Urban Agenda adopted during Habitat III in Quito, provide a new impetus to the work of countries and the international community at large to develop inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable cities. Although a considerable amount of research has already been carried out in this area, there is a need to clarify how global illicit flows and organised crime impact on local communities, particularly given their rapid evolution in the current context. Building on the work that has already been done in the field of crime prevention and urban safety, as well as drawing from detailed case studies from a number of cities across the world, and the input of a globally representative group of experts, this framework provides policymakers and practitioners with a new approach to safety in cities, taking into account how transnational organised crime and illicit flows exploit and exacerbate local vulnerabilities. It recognises that while many of the responsibilities for providing citizens with security lie with national governments, city administrations do have a key role to play in identifying crime risks and vulnerabilities and ensuring that safety and security policies are tailored to meet local needs, including by involving communities and other relevant non-state actors.

### **The intersection of the global and the local**

Many cities across the globe are being undermined by chronic insecurity and violence, which are often connected to crime challenges originating beyond their municipal borders. Analyses across ten cities, undertaken for the purposes of developing this framework, identified several key illicit flows that were relatively common and had a direct link to city safety, including trafficking of persons and drugs, illicit financial flows, firearms and counterfeit goods.

The impact of global illicit flows on city security and how they exacerbate risk factors for crime and violence at community level is often not well understood. Enforcement actions against those at local level engaged in illicit "retail" trade, for want of a better term, has until recently been considered the only way to address crime and violence, but

experience shows that an over-reliance on policing strategies may in fact exacerbate and displace the problems rather than mitigating the drivers undermining safety. Instead there is an urgent need to move towards more holistic, integrated strategies and interventions that offer a wider range of responses, and recognise the need to act locally in addition to deploying efforts at national or international level.

### **Risk factors associated with crime**

Risk factors for crime and delinquency are multiple, including individual-related factors such as sensation-seeking behaviour, early aggressiveness, or early use of substances; Family-related factors, or peer, school and community-related factors, e.g. friends who are gang members, little social cohesion, poor school performance, easy availability of firearms /drugs etc. In addition, larger national or global factors may lead to more crime, e.g. economic or humanitarian crises leading to displacement of large populations, lack of rule of law, illicit flows, or armed conflict.

It is this latter category of risk factors that this policy framework calls particular attention to, including unregulated urbanisation or the flows of drugs and other contraband; structural as well as socio-economic risks such as high levels of income and social inequality and associated concentrations of poverty; and, risks associated with weak governance and social cohesion, namely poor access to security and justice services and low levels of state legitimacy.

In cities where risk factors cumulate and where institutional settings and rule of law are weak, a structural context is created in which crime, violence and ‘criminal governance’ can flourish. It is important to note however that vulnerability to crime and violence cannot just be explained by a lack of resources; as a recent study by the United Nations University has demonstrated, fragile cities can be found in both the developed and developing world, and they are often a product of the intersection between local and global factors.

In order for states to maintain security and safety, infrastructure to deliver basic public services across all communities are crucial. In cities or neighbourhoods where such service provision, including access to justice, is lacking, and where governance and rule of law is limited, criminal groups have filled the power vacuum by offering alternative forms of governance and expanding their business. Indeed, as long as large proportions of urban populations are socially and economically excluded, crime (and associated violence), often associated with the trafficking of guns, drugs or human beings, can be seen as the only possible option for many, especially young people.

The challenge for urban institutions is to find ways to realistically engage in supporting communities and citizens; to build viable and trustworthy propositions of governance; and to provide the necessary oversight and transparency that will prevent these being subverted by illicit interests. That reinforces the requirement to focus on the rule of law, and building fair and inclusive institutions, in line with Goal 16 of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

### **Analysis: understanding the ecosystem**

The framework proposes that the use of a strategic approach to urban security should be based on an in-depth understanding of how a wider set of localised risk factors interact with illicit external flows to create conditions of insecurity, including different forms of ‘criminal governance’ that seek to subvert city and state governance. Responses, while context specific, must seek to reverse such processes, re-establishing legitimate governance, reducing inequality and promoting inclusion and individual and community resilience.

The framework underscores that insecurity in many cities increasingly lies at the intersection between external or global flows (threats) and their interface with local urban dynamics (vulnerabilities). This interplay may also exacerbate risk factors at city or community level. Without informed analysis a strategic response is unlikely or may be aimed at the wrong objectives.

The framework provides a process to guide policy makers to a better understanding of how to approach to addressing the intersection of global threats and local dynamics, including by identifying nodes or levers that could promote change; and seek out what builds resilience.

### **A response: the safety governance approach**

To develop a holistic and strategic approach to the challenge of insecurity, the framework uses a 'safety governance' lens that seeks to enhance the well-being of people and communities through appropriate management and allocation of resources across a city. Safety governance encapsulates a number of elements:

- *Regulation:* City governments have multiple regulatory powers related to crime prevention and control, but also to a range of other resource distribution and executive powers that can also be used as levers to reinforce security and address root causes enabling insecurity.
- *Enforcement:* Law enforcement must involve local communities and support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to pro-actively address conditions that give rise to public safety issues and fear of crime. Upholding human rights and the rule of law are key for enhancing safety in cities.
- *Engagement:* Engagement and communication remain among the most important tools that city officials may have in fostering inclusive, resilient and law-abiding societies. This must include marginalised and vulnerable groups.
- *Resilience:* There is a range of activities that reduce vulnerability and reinforce community resilience. These may require thinking innovatively about who may be able to contribute to community resilience and bolstering the intervention capacities of communities themselves, including drawing on the resilience of groups that are often excluded, such as women and the youth.

The framework highlights the requirement for socio-economic development and inclusion, including through spatial planning, housing, the provision of services and a constant process of engagement with all those involved. The result must be that all can benefit from the advantages that cities have to offer in terms of economic and social development, eliminating many of the risk factors for crime and violence, and placing particular emphasis on communities, families, children and youth at risk. Human rights and the rule of law must be respected in all aspects of safety and security policies and programmes, and a culture of lawfulness should be actively promoted. In terms of implementation, and drawing on the foundation of the 2002 UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, the framework highlights the following basic principles:

- *Government leadership:* all levels of government should play a leadership role in developing effective and humane crime prevention strategies;
- *Socio-economic development and inclusion:* Crime prevention considerations should be built into all relevant social and economic policies and programmes, including those addressing employment, education, health, housing and urban planning.
- *Cooperation and partnerships:* Given the wide-ranging nature of the causes of crime and the skills and responsibilities to address them, cooperation and partnership between ministries and between authorities, community

organizations, non-governmental organizations, the business sector and private citizens is needed.

- *Sustainability, accountability and resources:* Achieving safety is not possible without an investment of sustainable resources. There should be clear accountability for funding, implementation and evaluation of programmes, policies and initiatives
- *Knowledge base and monitoring:* strategies, policies and programmes to address crime and violence in cities, should be based on a broad, multidisciplinary foundation of knowledge about crime problems, their causes and promising and proven practices;
- *Promote a culture of lawfulness and human rights:* The focus on replacing 'criminal governance' with legitimate governance lies at the heart of the framework. Doing so must rely on building a culture of lawfulness that is based on human rights principles and the promotion of the rule of law.
- *Differentiation:* There is a need for programmes that are consultative and respectful of the conditions, resources and needs of local communities. This includes taking into account the different needs of women and men and the special requirements of vulnerable groups.
- *Interdependency:* National crime prevention diagnosis and strategies should, where appropriate, take account of links between local criminal problems and international organized crime;

In addition, to these basic principles, the framework promotes the following prerequisites for success:

- *A mix of practical and symbolic actions:* While it is accepted that practical outcomes must be achieved, symbolic measures may be no less important. These include the activities of individual leaders in promoting behaviours commensurate with high levels of integrity and the rule of law.
- *Innovation and experimentation:* In the complex environment in which most cities find themselves, many policy responses will by definition be locally contingent. That provides important space for innovation and experimentation.

## **PART I: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERDEPENDENCIES**

### ***The challenge***

Cities that fail will mean a global community that fails. Cities that are unsafe will condemn millions to reduced livelihoods and constrain the life chances of many, most notably vulnerable groups like women and children. Indeed, the strategic and political significance of cities implies that uncontrolled urban violence may, contribute to weaknesses of a state as a whole (World Bank 2015). If cities are to bring promise to the majority of the world's people, the focus must extend to understanding and responding to their complex safety challenges, not least of which are those engendered by the role of cities as clearing houses in the global economy.

Recent terrorist atrocities in Paris, Brussels or Lahore, Pakistan are a reminder that urban insecurity is seldom localised nor confined to any particular city. That point was driven home in the case of Brussels in March 2016, where the alleged perpetrators of the attacks on the airport and metro were reputed to have lived in a marginalised part of the city, to have participated as low level operatives in the urban criminal economy, and to have been radicalised by a set of global connections.

While such terrorist incidents immediately occupy global headlines, these often mask the more complex realities faced by urban managers across the world. That is, that forms of insecurity are changing, shaped by an intersection between global and local factors. City governments often respond that such insecurity is above all the responsibility of national governments; they are both right and wrong. National governments do have a key role to play, but so to do cities no matter what their responsibility for law enforcement. Cooperation between national and urban authorities is a pre-requisite for success.

Cities as widely divergent as Brussels and Lahore, as well as a multiplicity of other urban complexes, have become critical nodes in a new age of global governance. They are not only hubs of economic productivity, but are at the intersection of cross-border flows of people, goods and ideas. More than 54% of the world's population currently lives in an urban environment, and urban populations are predicted to grow by a rate of 1.5–2% per year. An emerging phenomenon is that of the mega-city: vast metropolises of more than 10 million people. There are 28 mega-cities today, whereas in 1950 there was just one (UN 2014: 2).


These challenges are explicitly recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals<sup>1</sup>. Goal 11 focuses on making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Safety, as outlined by the targets set out for the goal, focuses on achieving inclusive and equitable economic development and the provision of basic infrastructure and services. Goal 16's focus is on promoting just, peaceful and inclusive societies. This recognises the link between development and the rule of law, including the necessity of reducing levels of violence, illicit trafficking and corruption within security institutions in order to promote sustainable development. At the same time, the development and finalization of the New Urban Agenda at Habitat III in October 2016 will guide the efforts around urbanization of a wide range of actors — nation states, city and regional leaders, international development funders, United Nations programmes and civil society — for the next 20 years. The agenda thus also lays the groundwork for policies and approaches, including those relating to safety in a globalised world, that will extend, and impact, far into the future.

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<sup>1</sup> Refer to *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (A/RES/70/1)

### *The rural urban violence divide*

The UNODC Global Study on Homicide notes that urban and rural areas are host to different mixes of social and criminological risk and protective factors (UNODC 2011: 12; UNODC 2013: 27). For example, urban areas may face violence enablers, including higher levels of income inequality, opportunities for anonymity, and the existence of organised criminal groups; they may also face violence mitigators like more extensive policing, surveillance opportunities, and better access to medical care and social services. The balance of such factors varies between and within countries and sub-national regions, but in most cases results in larger cities having considerably higher homicide rates than their national averages. Countries with high levels of violence, for which homicide is a proxy, often see the greatest concentrations of that violence in their major cities. The urban bias of homicide is especially marked in Central America, the Caribbean, and parts of Africa, while some countries especially in Eastern Europe show the reverse. Figure 1 illustrates selected city homicide rates in comparison to national homicide averages, demonstrating the variability of the relationship as well the large urban dimension in high violence countries (UNODC 2013:27-28).



*Figure 1: Selected populous cities and national homicide rates per 100,000*

Urban security is thus increasingly a concern for a wide spectrum of policy makers: at national, provincial or state level, and not least of all in city governments themselves. This framework is addressed to these decision makers and builds on important work in the wider area of crime prevention, most notably the 2002 UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime. By doing so, it seeks to fill an important gap in the available policy literature: that is, *the way in which global illicit flows intersect with local vulnerabilities to give rise to significant safety challenges and how these might be addressed*. As such, and given the complexity of these debates, the framework does not claim to be exhaustive,

nor, given the wide variety of contexts that it seeks to address, can it be prescriptive. Rather, it could be described as a contribution to the wider and evolving debate on city security. At heart then, it is aspirational, outlining the challenges, providing an analytical framework for thinking and discussion, offering some solutions, and calling for greater experimentation and action.

### ***Risk factors***

As the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development attests, there is an increasing recognition of the linkages between a range of risk factors and the fragility of cities. Risks generally act in combination – in that sense they are cumulative, a series of inter-dependent risks that can impact on each other. It is crucial therefore to understand fragility not simply as a result of one or more factors, but as accumulating at their intersections. The risks (World Bank 2015; WEF 2015; OECD 2012; UNSSR Task Force 2016: 3-4) faced in urban complexities, or in parts of them are related to the economic situation or the way a city is governed and manages to promote social cohesion. In addition, cities face external risks that have an impact on safety and security at the local level.

Acting together, these factors greatly increase levels of vulnerability in urban concentrations; given this, they must be monitored together and not in isolation. These vulnerabilities may manifest as sudden shocks or longer term underlying stressors, such that cities can shift quite rapidly along a continuum between fragility and resilience (WEF 2015: 2). Importantly, these factors should not be regarded only as the results of endogenous local “incapacities”, as they are often embedded in broader political, economic, social or ecological dynamics at the national, regional and international level (ICM 2015: 1).

In addition, as a large-scale project on measuring city fragility by the United Nations University has noted (see the box below), it is not necessarily the largest cities that are most susceptible to fragility. ‘Rather, it is smaller- and medium-sized cities that are most at risk. Just three megacities (over 10 million residents) and three very large cities (with between five and 10 million people) are at high risk of fragility including Baghdad, Dar es Salaam, Johannesburg, Karachi, Lagos, and Shanghai. But there are another 56 large cities, 42 medium-sized cities, and 40 smaller cities that are also categorized as fragile.’ (Muggah 2016). Given the projected growth in populations of medium-sized cities, and the increasing connections between these cities and the wider world, they are likely to have a substantial impact on security and development in the coming decades.

#### *The global distribution of fragile cities*

This framework drew on research in major cities. Each is faced by considerable challenges of insecurity, with strong linkages to global flows and influences. Yet path-breaking work on city vulnerability and resilience by the Centre for Policy Research at the United Nations University suggests how widely distributed city fragility may be. While data availability and quality varied, the project measured fragility across a range of factors, including: income inequality; concentrated poverty; youth unemployment; natural hazard exposure; real and perceived insecurity; and policing and justice deficits. Fragile cities emerged across the globe – in developing and developed countries – and often concentrated in coastal areas with heightened vulnerability to rising sea levels as a result of climate change (United Nations University et al 2016).




Figure 2: The spread of city fragility across the world

Where cities are growing has also changed dramatically. The new engine of urbanisation is in developing countries. According to the United Nations, globally, an additional 2.5 billion people will move to urban areas by 2050, with nearly 90% of the increase concentrated in Asia and Africa (UN 2014). But developed country cities are changing too, with an influx of new immigrants and the concomitant challenge of building inclusive societies.

Negative forces of globalisation, weak or distorted forms of local governance and a set of pro-violence conditions in society have created situations of extreme human insecurity. These are interrelated; however, most research and policy work concentrates not on the *intersections*, but on each of the factors in isolation. While each is important in its own right, the reality of the emerging safety challenge is to understand more effectively how these dynamics act on each other – and what conditions will maximise safety and development opportunities for citizens.

This framework focuses on a specific intersection of risk factors – namely the interaction between illicit flows and local vulnerabilities – and what city governments may be able to do to respond to them.

**Putting city security on the global agenda**

Many cities now face a reality in which they are developing incredibly fast, and yet also becoming increasingly dangerous. People living together in close proximity and in conditions of poverty, inequality, marginalisation and poor governance, are more likely to be affected by crime and insecurity. As a result, insecurity and violence threaten enormous numbers of people across the world’s cities, with those who bear the brunt of

violence often the poorest and most marginalised, particularly women and young people. Marginalised parts of cities are not isolated from their immediate context nor from global illicit flows, but are intimately connected to them.

Important international policy processes that identify city safety as a defining issue are now under way. UN-Habitat has long advocated for the concept of more inclusive and safer cities, including producing a new set of guidelines in this regard (UN-Habitat 2016). The 'New Urban Agenda' that emerged from the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) is a defining moment in the debate on urbanisation and sustainable development.

What is new to the discussion is to make the link between the external flows and local security. This is a significant step forward from the development framework of the previous generation, by mainstreaming safety objectives as the foundation of development progress. For example, of the 169 targets that underpin the Sustainable Development Agenda, more than 12% (23 targets in total) relate to mitigating organised crime (Global Initiative 2015). This is ground breaking, as organised crime was an issue that was once explicitly excluded from the lexicon and mandate of development actors, but now is understood as an increasingly central concern, to be addressed as a development challenge and requiring a development response.

The *World Development Report 2011* first clearly identified in a seminal and widely read policy document that the nature of safety, insecurity and conflict had evolved, no longer fitting the mould of the past. It argued that repeated cycles of violence, connected to weak governance, instability and different forms and levels of crime, are constraining development and economic growth for citizens – not only in fragile and conflict-affected states, but increasingly across states and urban hubs regardless of income level. The report concluded that this has created a system by which local violence is shaped by an extremely complex array of factors, often in a highly politicised environment; this in turn negatively undermines the quality of institutions and governance, and the provision of economic and social development. The net result is that countries experiencing high levels of protracted violence see a causal reduction in development performance – estimated at 20% – and decades' worth of economic growth (World Bank 2011: xii).

The 2015 OECD *States of Fragility* report recognised the urgency of moving towards a more multi-dimensional understanding of what is needed to achieve sustainable development. By changing the framework, several middle-income countries with disproportionately high levels of crime-related violence, sub-national conflict or poor access to justice came sharply into focus as being 'fragile'.

### ***Interconnections in a changing world***

Areas of urban fragility and insecurity are increasingly connected between different cities, across the urban-rural divide, and with larger zones of poor governance and insecurity. This is the result of the intersection between urbanisation, global patterns of migration and rapid advancements in communication technology. Increasingly, it is the relationships between people in disparate locations that define the context in which they live, rather than being limited simply to their local geography or political institution.

Moreover, the assumption is often that only the wealthy are in communication. Indeed, wealthy inhabitants of many cities in the world are far more likely to connect across borders with each other than with the poor in their own cities. The assumption should not be made, however, that the poor and marginalised are not also connected across borders. Global flows of migrants, growing diaspora populations, and the growth in

electronic and financial flows occur at all levels of society, and cities are at the centre of this interconnectivity.

As global inequality has grown – not only do 70% of people live in an environment where income inequality is increasing, but a recent report has highlighted that a mere 62 individuals hold as much wealth as the bottom half of the global population (Oxfam 2014) - perceptions that governments are corrupt and self-serving, or that elites are capturing disproportionate shares of national wealth and influence have further increased the distance between citizen and the state. Instead, people are using communication technology to find alternative groups with which to affiliate, which may not be those with which they are co-located. As a consequence, their sense of collective ownership in their urban environment and their sense of civic responsibility is eroded, contributing to a further degradation of the city as a meaningful source of value. Such a process of erosion may contribute to people feeling alienated from state institutions, including those at the level of the city. A globalised world offers opportunities for shared interest groups that are geographically dispersed to be brought together through a common social platform. This can bring benefits – diasporas have been an important source of resilience, for example – but also challenges.

### ***The 'fragile city' and achieving safety***

Cities need to find innovative ways to govern their own safety in an age of interconnectivity. Modern cities now serve as the primary nodes in the fundamental systems that structure the contemporary global political-economy – ranging from, amongst others, financial systems, government platforms and transportation routes. If the city is not functioning, then this impacts on the entire country, and often the wider region.

#### *What is meant by "safety"<sup>2</sup>?*

Safety can be thought of as physical protection, but it can also be used in the wider sense, speaking to the ability of people to make the choices they consider necessary for their own lives. That implies that safety is a necessary condition for providing life choices to individual people. Life chances are dramatically reduced in contexts of violence, fear and uncertainty, but equally when social services such as education and health are poor, missing or difficult to access. Indeed, lower levels of physical safety are almost always present when wider forms of opportunity and service delivery are absent. That is no coincidence. Safety then encompasses much more than simply protecting people – it means the development of educational structures, recreational venues, the harnessing of local skills, and the facilitation of community-building activities focussed on the needs of specific groups such as women and young people. When viewed from this perspective, safety has everything to do with inclusive development, and thus the needs to be strategically integrated in the deployment of resources and interventions.

The extent of violence and the fragmentation of the provision of safety is one of the greatest challenges faced in unsafe cities, and it is usually the first one to attract the

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<sup>2</sup> While 'insecurity' denotes conditions where there is crime, violence, corruption, fear and uncertainty, use of the term 'security' as a response has been avoided, given its often narrower interpretation in some contexts. The aim, as Part III of this framework demonstrates, is to suggest that city and other levels of government should aim at establishing a system of 'safety governance'.

attention of policy makers. Violence is a clear warning flare that all is not well: it is disconcerting to the middle-class electorate to which governments often respond; it undermines investment; erodes development progress for the majority; and creates widespread insecurity. As the various experimentations with gang truces in violent cities have exemplified, the objective of these responses is to prevent homicides and lower violence, not to stop underlying criminal behaviour. Similarly, violent extremism mobilises international attention and prompt reactions, whereas growing religious fundamentalism may be allowed to continue unchecked, regardless of the implications for human rights or civil liberties.

Increasing violence manifests in multiple ways, and fragile cities are often characterised by a growing proliferation of non-statutory security forces, such as liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies and political party militias, all of which undermine the state's monopoly of force. Their genesis, however, in many of the cities studied, did not come from an intention to challenge the state, but emerged as security entities in response to real or perceived threats. Routinely, these groups developed out of the 'margins', in and from populations neglected by the state's governance and protection, or, in some cases, as a result of direct persecution by the state itself.

Thus, the initial motivation for many of these groups was to provide some semblance of 'safety' for members, and, sometimes, for a constituency. With strength in numbers, these groups are able to push back against the forces that threaten them – whether police, rival groups or larger social forces. It is only once these groups have established some kind of control or order in a given territory or constituency that they must find the means to sustain and commodify it. Thus, the requirement to provide genuine security morphs over time into security from self-imposed threats. As UNODC described in relation to drug-trafficking groups in Latin America, socially excluded people often lack access to security, as well as other amenities provided to better-established residents. In this context, 'neighbourhood watches', which may have started as a mechanism for providing security to new immigrants and other vulnerable people, over time morph into informal private security operations that impose a tax on local residents, target the most vulnerable, including women and children, and ultimately become a protection racket. (UNODC 2012a)

*São Paulo: governing through organised crime*

In São Paulo people join organised-crime groups for their protective functions. These groups, most notably the one that dominates the city, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), have become impossible to separate from their roots in places that are historically violent and subject to violence, especially prisons and the city's slums. A recent study claims that violence in the city is regulated in a complicated consensus between the police and the PCC. Reductions in violence are a direct result of forms of governance exerted by organised crime. Spurts of violence result when the consensus between police and criminal groups breaks down (see Willis 2015).

***Inequality and illicit livelihoods***

The challenge now is that many cities act as fulcrums around which illegitimate systems of violence, criminal activity and structural problems revolve. In contrast to predictions of sustained economic development, bringing with it prosperity for the inhabitants of cities, in many instances socio-economic development has been haphazard and inconsistent, and these disparities have contributed to the emergence of 'shadow' markets and economies. Driven by the same needs and desires that underpin the formal economy, shadow markets have emerged in *response* to unequal developmental narratives, in which many residents find few ways to earn a genuine living in the formal economy.

In many cases poverty and unemployment do not just provide a greater supply of potential illegal labour for organised criminal activities, but also create a favourable environment for criminals to exploit the social fabric of countries as a foundation for organised crime and criminal governance. Limited authority in the economic and security sectors are often linked, as illicit flows are used to finance parastatal security forces and fuel violence. For example, the rise of organised crime in Africa became perceptible at a time of extensive political and economic change where accessing resources was a means to build political settlements and gain influence (Ellis and Shaw 2015). Foreign actors with the capacity to bring resources, or to bring domestic commodities to international markets, became potent interfaces between global illicit flows and local socio-economic and political manoeuvrings (Varese 2011). Rapid urban and economic expansion, in particular in environments with weaker systems of transparency and accountability and with institutions of limited capacity may present extensive opportunities for corruption.

*Avoiding 'criminal governance'*

'Criminal governance' refers to the phenomena where criminal interests regulate markets themselves, either because these are illegal or because state institutions are weak and corrupted. Extortion is the classic case of criminal governance: 'protection' is sold to people on the basis that the sellers are themselves the source of any potential violence and disruption. Forms of extortion are reported to be present in almost all of the ten cities studied. As extortion illustrates, criminal governance is a distortion of open and transparent forms of governance: it benefits only a few and often militates against sustainable economic activities. Shopping and restaurant areas where there is extortion often die slow deaths as they are starved of investment (Frazzica et al 2016).

Organised criminal activity across the world is worth some US\$870 billion a year (UNODC 2012b). Realigning and making relevant developmental strategies requires that growth is not only recorded numerically, but felt in a very real sense by those who live and work in the world's cities, particularly given some of the demographic pressures. Youth bulges and other structural conditions are resulting in a growing proportion of people in many of the cities who should be active and productive members of the labour force, but are, instead, 'NINIs' (not in school and not employed) – unskilled, and with limited legal economic opportunities. It is often criminal enterprises that offer not only the lowest barriers to entry for employment, but also the highest returns. Furthermore, this applies as much to women as to men, though rarely are responses such as livelihood strategies targeted at women.

***Alternative governance: competition and cooperation***

While illicit or illegal activities may be illegitimate in the eyes of governing organisations, local communities and individuals may view them in entirely different ways. In the absence of governing institutions that meet their needs, local populations may view criminal enterprises as having legitimacy and inspiring greater loyalty

By defining organised crime and the violence perpetrated by criminal groups as merely being in response to market forces – 'entrepreneurial' entities – is to underplay the role that these groups often play in providing security and filling a market void. This assumption about organised crime has defined many of the responses to it. Anti-organised crime policies often hold that disrupting economic lifelines will undermine its strength and lead to its dissolution. Drug interdiction programmes, seizures of goods, killing of leaders and the mass imprisonment of related offenders are a logical extension of this view, which supposes that such organisations will cease to exist if their

connection to the market – products, intelligence or manpower – is severed. However, where criminal groups are providing a service to the local population their position is much more complex and powerful. Across the globe there are many examples of organised crime and terror groups delivering other kinds of services, including social services, livelihoods and some forms of social organisation and justice. In doing so they gain local legitimacy distinct from their illicit economic activities.

Organised-crime groups are frequently portrayed as infiltrating the state, but a closer analysis demonstrates that firstly it tends to be the state – through its absence and failures – that opens the space for other groups to gain traction. In some cases, this has been so because the state cannot or will not; in some cases, it is done with the tacit permission of the state; in others, it is done in partnership with actors of the state or its institutions, where both sides gain from the association, and state actors engage in ‘profitable permissiveness’ – a coexistence that is purely tacit and based on toleration and a degree of distance between the parties (Briscoe and Kalkman 2016). In some cities in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America, criminal–political relationships have advanced to unprecedented levels of complexity and sophistication.

By contrast, terrorist groups gain from their capacity to distance and distinguish themselves from the state, which is in part why strategies that conflate organised crime and terror lack nuance. However, they may profit from governance vacuums, or from predatory governance or corrupt states as well, and the power of these groups is based upon an ability to manipulate local grievances to their benefit as well as to employ the threat of violent force. In their strategies for resourcing their acts, however, they follow very similar models to crime groups, establishing protection taxes on the communities within their control.

#### *Nairobi: conflict and collusion*

The cities studied for this framework have all undergone dramatic changes within short spaces of time – they are truly cities ‘in flux’. In the case of Nairobi, where political, economic and criminal factors have intersected to produce serious violence. At the same time, the city and its economy have continued to grow.

In 2008, an estimated 1,500 people died and 650,000 people were displaced due to post-election violence, mostly committed by gangs. Nairobi’s poorest areas were carved into enclaves where vigilante groups and criminal organisations associated with different ethnic groups patrolled ‘their’ areas, demanding to see identity cards, carrying out evictions and attacking the homes and retail premises of members of opposing ethnic groups.

Provision of security services by Nairobi local government is uneven, with most of the informal settlements left out of the planning and budgeting process. However, even those in the affluent areas do not always rely on formal police or the local government for provision of security, water or garbage collection among other things, since the services are either substandard and their availability is not predictable (see Mutahi 2015).

The case study cities suggest that the linkages between what are often referred to as distinct categories of phenomena – organised crime, corruption and terrorism – are difficult to disentangle on the ground (see also Shelley 2014). Each category serves to shape the others and there are often important overlaps between actors, as well as connections between illicit economies and the power structures they enable. That suggests an important degree of convergence between these three issue areas (crime, corruption and terrorism).

Corruption not only has the effect of undermining the strength and/or operational effectiveness of local government agencies, but may actually serve as the means by which they are transformed into facilitators of other forms of criminal activity. In such cases, the flow of resources and capabilities offered by development actors may be redirected to further facilitate the very groups and individuals they are intended to undermine.

In areas where they are marred by corruption, local government agencies need to be held accountable to those from whom they receive funds and direction, and in such cases regulatory systems and oversight should be driven by agencies separate from higher levels of government. This is so because local government agencies may be subject to manipulation by overseers drawn from the same governmental structures, or may simply continue any problematic practices that have already been entrenched at the national level (See UNODC 2013b, UNODC 2014b and UNODC 2015).

At the local level, simply putting visible signs of 'government' or straightforward provision of services into communities that are under the control of organised crime and terrorist groups may not be effective in addressing governance deficits, unless the issue of legitimacy is considered. The challenge for urban institutions will be to find ways to realistically engage in supporting communities and citizens both nationally and locally to build viable and trustworthy propositions of governance and to provide the necessary oversight and transparency that will prevent these being subverted by illicit interests. This reinforces the requirement to focus on the rule of law and fair and inclusive institutions, in line with Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda. The way that the international community supports service delivery, development and governance, and engages in efforts to counter organised crime, may need to be rethought, with focus on effective governance and an understanding of how legitimacy is earned and retained in vulnerable communities.

### ***An opportunity for leadership***

The idea that the local dynamics of cities can be shaped by global forces, and that some cities may now be seen as fragile, can be presented in ominous terms. However, such environments are also vital spaces for the creation of new opportunities. Those communities that have become unstable may often seem to be teetering on the brink of disaster. However, it is precisely because of instability that opportunities may exist for making substantive positive reform. Communities that are very stable can also be slow to change should a problem or concern emerge, while communities that lack this stability may in some cases have more room and flexibility to devise and apply new measures specific to their circumstances, and react quickly to understand effects of policies and programmes. It is critical then that difficult situations, complex dynamics and unstable communities are not isolated and forgotten because of the risks they present, but are seen as opportunities for ingenuity, innovation and local leadership. To make effective changes in these places, it is critical for city governments to understand why they are unstable, and prioritise projects aimed at championing their efforts to become safer and better places to live.

There are no easy answers: achieving this will require a dynamic and iterative approach from city, provincial and national governments. Parts II and III provide a framework for thinking how this might be done, and are directed at policy makers at all levels of government. A central message is that city safety will only be achieved if all stakeholders work together.

## **PART II: PLANNING AND ANALYSIS**

Part I pointed to the complex interconnections that drive insecurity in many cities. These are the intersection between external or global flows (threats) and their interface with local urban dynamics (vulnerabilities) that exacerbate risk factors at city/community level. Without informed analysis, a strategic response will be unlikely or different interests may drive a set of fragmented projects and programmes. Part II seeks to take this thinking further by examining how cities in a globalised world might analyse issues of safety, with a focus on the links between illicit flows/markets and insecurity. This is the central suggestion of Part II: that is, to understand holistically, based on good evidence, what is driving and resourcing forms of alternative governance which bring violence and deepen the divide between people and state and city institutions.

### ***Understanding risks and challenges***

#### *Data availability and integration*

A proper understanding of the threats and challenges that communities face requires tools and techniques to regularly collect data, develop policy-relevant advice, and ensure that results are communicated effectively. In many countries, there has been limited or incomplete data on the state of communities at the level of the municipality or lower levels. For security-related issues, data collection problems can be compounded by low reporting rates, lack of trust in institutions, poor local collection capacity, as well as a general environment of violence and intimidation surrounding the reporting of crime. In addition, the perceptions and experiences of communities themselves, including victims of crime and particularly vulnerable populations, can go entirely unrecognised though these may prove essential in understanding and addressing security concerns. Both lack of data and lack of data at a sufficiently fine level (allowing, for instance, geolocation and mapping of crime rates in different neighbourhoods) can inhibit development of appropriate municipal security governance plans and strategies.

Additionally, the task of data collection and analysis may be split between different agencies and levels of government. For instance, national statistical authorities may collect information related to broader social and economic factors affecting a country or region, security agencies may collect information on issues of crime and violence, while municipalities themselves may have the best information on patterns of urban development within their jurisdictions. If these data-originating agencies are not connected and do not share relevant information, the lack of integration of different data sources and potential influences on security governance may hinder the identification of potential risks or avenues to address security-related issues.

Improving modalities for integrating data from different agencies, as well as different kinds of data, can be useful in crime and urban safety frameworks (including local safety audits<sup>3</sup>). These frameworks may seek to understand and address security taking into account socio-economic factors in the relevant communities. For instance, links may be sought between the prevalence of criminal acts and factors and indicators in the economic (e.g. income, education, inequality), social (e.g. changes in family structures with communities, gang affiliation) and political (e.g. official corruption, security policies) arenas. Assisting authorities and communities in both developing data collection and analytical capacity as well as in sharing and collecting of information

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<sup>3</sup> See *European Forum on Urban Safety (EFUS)*, 2007

between actors and across thematic boundaries can be instrumental in addressing municipal security challenges.

*The South African Cities Network indicators project*

Several cities in the developing world have begun to experiment with a variety of approaches to measuring safety in the context of inequality and efforts to improve social cohesion. While critical steps forward, these are generally very local in scope, and seldom take into account a wider set of external factors that may drive insecurity. The indicators project of the South African Cities Network (SACN), a central government-funded network of all the country's major cities, is an attempt to define a series of measures related to social and structural risk factors and their linkage to levels of safety.



*Figure 2: Three layers of indicators to measure safety in South African cities*

As illustrated in the diagram above, indicators are divided across three levels: at the core are a series of measures of insecurity; followed by indicators that define inequality and social risk; and, finally, a set of indicators that measure cities' responses. The purpose of grouping indicators in this way is to measure a set of associated factors within one framework, giving a single 'score card' of city progress across a number of areas relevant to achieving safety (see SACN 2015).

A summary of the selected indicators in each of the three levels is as follows:

- *Crime and violence:* official reporting rates of five baskets of crime types, including an indicator of crime related to illicit trafficking; a measure of public and collective violence (protests and civil actions); indicators of crime tied to police activities (such as road blocks or search operations); gender-based violence and social cohesion indices, and importantly, specific indicators on peoples' perceptions and fears of crime and safety.
- *Social and structural risk factors:* levels of population growth and urbanisation; population density in different parts of the city; social incoherence and disruption of families; income inequality; youth deprivation and unemployment; violence in schools; and access to alcohol, drugs and firearms.
- *Strategic responses:* social programmes; development and environmental crime prevention efforts; improvements in the functioning of schools; upgrading of vulnerable areas; and collaboration between state and non-state forms of

policing.

As is clear from the array and complexity of different indicators, providing a simple “reading” of the progress being made in any city is extremely hard to achieve. Yet, at the same time, the very process of providing a list of inter-related measures highlights the linkages between local development and safety initiatives and external factors, such as illicit trafficking of drugs, which city governments may have little control of. For the SACN, this is important work in progress, aimed at guiding South African cities in framing future policy responses at a more strategic level.

#### *Understanding what to measure*

The use of statistical and numerical data, especially when encompassing entities as large as cities, often has the effect of de-contextualising the lives of the people. *Development* of a community or population can be seen through many lenses, such as economic growth, education rates and access to healthcare, with the often implicit assumption that an improvement to these statistics itself constitutes ‘development’. In the process of quantifying human life, it should not be forgotten that policy frameworks, strategies and toolkits should be attentive to the manner in which they describe and understand the people they are intended to help.

Furthermore, that a policy or strategy may produce positive numeric indicators may not necessarily translate into the improvement of residents’ environments in real terms. In short, to do justice to the normative impulses informing the concept of development requires that the complexity of the relationships and interactions that define people’s lives are taken seriously. Not doing so prioritises the politics of development over the improvement of lives and reduces individuals to mere data points. Forethought, care and attention, above all else, is required so that progress towards development targets reflect substantive changes in individuals’ lives, rather than procedural changes to the statistical models used.

#### *Valuing (and measuring) social connectedness*

Poverty is more easily measured than an array of other factors that may be key to determining levels of safety. New research suggests, for example, that social connectedness is a key form of quality of life and of resilience, a concept explored in more detail below. The OECD (2011) used four measures of social connectedness: social network support; frequency of social contact; time spent volunteering in community organisations; and, trust in others. Where such forms of social capital are present, local societies are much less susceptible to the damage that occurs when external flows provide an alternative form of incentives. Children and youth who experience social isolation struggle with low self esteem and poor emotional health, perform poorly at school and are vulnerable to external influence (Synergos 2016). Thus, a variety of forms of social capital may be key to determining how communities respond to external threats; yet, measures of these dimensions are often poor and seldom tied to policy making (Samuel et al 2014).

#### *Risk and Threat Identification*

Building on the three broad risk categories identified in Part I (p. 6), the connection between the specific area of vulnerability and potential impact that such risk has on urban communities to be further understood. This may serve as a further guide to areas in which further information can be sought (for instance, by identifying potential areas where data needs to be further developed, populations need to be surveyed, etc.) as well as for beginning of a process of mapping relationships. Such an approach takes into

account both the relationships but also the evidential basis for making these connections.

Note that these categories and subcategories are intended as a guide for thinking about the relationships between risk factors, and are themselves not intended to be exhaustive. It should also be noted that methods for identifying risk factors have been used, for example in crime prevention<sup>4</sup>.

<b>External risks with local impacts</b>	<p><i>Including urban surroundings, illicit trade, the environment, ideology and macroeconomic issues, e.g.:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Rapid, unregulated or poorly regulated urbanisation;</li> <li>● Flows of drugs, arms or other contraband into local spaces;</li> <li>● Exposure to climate change;</li> <li>● Vulnerability to the risk of natural disaster;</li> <li>● The flows of ideas and ideologies that promote violence;</li> <li>● Financial crises or contagion at national or international level.</li> </ul>
<b>Structural and (local) economic risks</b>	<p><i>Including urban poverty, inequality and local economic factors, e.g.:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● High levels of income and social inequality;</li> <li>● Concentrations of poverty;</li> <li>● Large bulges of unemployed youth;</li> <li>● High financial capital flight risk;</li> <li>● High human capital flight risk;</li> </ul>
<b>Weak governance and social cohesion</b>	<p><i>Including local ideological issues, discrimination, social integration, and governance capacities, e.g.:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Grievances around race, ethnicity or religion;</li> <li>● Populations that are isolated or displaced;</li> <li>● Women, children and other vulnerable groups suffer particular forms of abuse or unequal treatment;</li> <li>● Poor access to or and/or quality of security and justice services;</li> <li>● Poor state and/or political legitimacy;</li> <li>● Communities that lack strong and stable bonds;</li> <li>● Provision of security and governance by non-state actors;</li> </ul>

A final key factor that emerged in discussions on understanding of risks and challenges is proximity to the local community. A process of engagement that involves the local community and authorities with responsibility for security and urban governance allows for proper identification of risk factors, as well as potential priorities. It further allows the identification of risks and challenges that predominantly affect certain groups or sub-populations. It may also be the first step in developing increased trust between the community and various levels of governance, especially in contexts where this trust has broken down or otherwise been absent.

<sup>4</sup> Other models may seek to identify in a community a mix of individual-related factors (e.g. sensation-seeking behaviours, aggressiveness, delinquency), family-related factors (e.g. family member involvement in crime, parental involvement in children, substance abuse by family member), peer / school / community-related factors (e.g. availability of firearms or drugs, access to work, education, gang membership in the community), and national / global factors (e.g. economic crises, absence of rule of law, climate change, armed conflict).

## ***A Suggested Analytical Approach***

The growth of cities is the product of a multiplicity of forces, both internal and external. Cities are not stagnant entities, but are continuously shaped by their environments. The city is a system with its own internal currents – global forces can and do shape these local dynamics by influencing how that system functions.

It is for this reason that an understanding of cities as systems of interrelated and interacting parts and processes, tying together risk factors, resilience factors, data and outcomes, is useful: it helps to explain both how cities work and how outside forces may interact with local issues to shift or change risk factors and influences. By understanding the relationships between these external factors, internal dynamics of the cities and the health and security status of communities, policies and initiatives can be designed in an integrated and holistic manner, while being responsive to changing global environments (see Nutley et al 2007 and Pawson and Tilley 1997).

When starting with a systems analysis approach, it is important to understand that such an approach necessarily involves engaging a wide range of local actors and perspectives in order to produce a robust understanding of the key factors, influences, risks and relationships that affect a city. It is for this reason that a systems analysis perspective is adopted here. This is done, on the one hand, in an attempt to grasp the manner in which safety and development interrelate in a holistic way, and on the other, to provide a realistic representation of the cities and their dynamics and how these impact upon local populations.

### *Changing the conditions that help to breed violence*

Gender disparities remain a significant structural obstacle to the fulfilment of development ideals, often reinforcing pre-existing vulnerabilities in communities already under socio-economic pressure. Working towards eliminating the structural limitations which reinforce these differences is pivotal in ensuring the successful development of local communities.

It must be remembered that such disparities must not only be seen in the formalised difference found in religious or customary practices, but in the microcosm of daily life. Recent research has also highlighted how violence against women and children creates vicious cycles of violence: violent homes where women and children are victimised shapes a set of outcomes, producing conditions for the generation of wider and on-going societal violence.

In this way the intersection between vulnerability and violence is bred through an established (albeit broken) system. Policy-making must seek to break this cycle such as through a focus on early childhood education, on developing extensive safe spaces for women and children and work programmes that delink young men from the systemic conditions that breed violence (Morgan 2013 and Morgan et al 2014).

The framework seeks to apply a systems approach to an analysis of any city ecosystem of violence, taking into account the connections between risks, external flows and local resilience factors. Expert discussions convened for this purpose, highlighted the importance of connecting risk factors and security concerns, the flows of resources (e.g. commodities, money, people – *see below*) into and out of a particular urban environment, who manages those flows and how, and the responses of government actors. This can be summarised in the following questions:

- What are the most challenging safety and security concerns in a city? (*see discussion above on risk factors and challenges*)
- Which external flows impact on those safety and security concerns?

- Which actors are involved (local, national, international) in facilitating these flows?
- What levels and entities of government are responding to these flows?
- What resources or entities in communities promote or inhibit safety through the management of these flows?

In answering these questions, the framework offers a broad five-step process to assist with the analysis and to map connections between risk and insecurity challenges that affect particular communities or populations, ‘flows’ that affect the security of certain communities or populations, groups (including government actors) that attempt to control or regulate the flows, other factors that may influence either the control and regulation of flows, and potential points of resilience or positive change. It should be noted that, as highlighted above, improvements in data, information and analytical capacity can aid significantly in understanding these dynamics.

<b>Mapping systemic relationships between threats, flows and resilience</b>				
<i>Threat or risk</i>	<i>Flow that influences the threat of risk</i>	<i>Actors that manage or regulate flow<sup>5</sup></i>	<i>Actions of relevant government agency or actor</i>	<i>Potential positive change or resilience factors</i>

### *1. Identifying flows that impact upon city insecurity*

In different ways, every city is impacted upon by illicit external and internal ‘flows’. In most cases city authorities consider these flows either to be irrelevant to the day-to-day management of urban spaces, or at least to be someone else’s responsibility – usually that of the central government. Yet, as has been suggested above, such flows connect cities and are central to shaping many relationships and their associated networks.

#### *What is an illicit ‘flow’?*

This framework uses a relatively broad definition of ‘flows’, encompassing resource streams that move into or through urban environments. Such flows include therefore a wide variety of commodities, from the more obvious ones like people, money<sup>6</sup> and drugs, to the less apparent, such as illicit activities connected to city transport systems. Resources can be extracted from such flows in two ways:

- (1) through their movement (trafficking) and sale; and
- (2) through the extraction of protection payments by local powerholders.

While some flows are by their nature legal, the illegality arises from how they are managed and/or the degree to which violence, or the threat of violence, is associated with them. .

<sup>5</sup> This includes non-state actors and criminal groups

<sup>6</sup> Another cross-cutting issue is that of illicit financial flows (IFF), which have been recognised by governments, civil society organisations and the international community as a priority policy issue for economic development, governance and security. There is recognition of the relationship between IFFs and the ability of all countries to ensure sustainable domestic resources, as the presence of IFFs often imply that significant parts of the domestic economy governmental oversight and taxation. There is therefore a link between preventing the crime that creates these IFFs, and sustainable development. From a public policy point of view, preventing and mitigating the risks of IFFs demands a rigorous approach to policy coherence across institutions at all levels.

The analysis conducted across the ten case study cities identified several key flows that were relatively common and often directly linked to city safety. These are:

- movements of people, whether done legally or illegally, and including the movement of women and children for sexual and labour exploitation;
- illicit drugs;
- forms of transport, mainly privately managed taxis and buses sometimes linked to criminal networks;
- ideas, often related to religious extremism, but also to the spread of forms of gang organisation and culture;
- flows of money, including their investment in a series of activities at city level, most notably construction;
- firearms; and
- illicit or counterfeit goods.

Though identifying security challenges that result from flows of people is of huge importance for the management of cities, but it should be emphasised here that the movement of people brings many positive developments. Migrants from rural areas and other countries may bring new skills, are often committed to making new lives for themselves, and have levels of resilience that ‘insiders’ with more settled lives cannot hope to attain. However, the case studies show that flows of people that are badly managed can cause significant levels of disruptive conflict and promote wider insecurity, including by undercutting the ability to promote and sustain economic growth.

#### *New technologies and the measurement of flows*

Technology in data management, mining, and synthesis is creating new opportunities to understand and analyze international, domestic, and local flows of information and urban development. There are many tools available to cities to understand and manage new forms of information. Three of the most available include: monitoring and data mining in social media; real time tracking and mapping of crime and violence; and data visualization of international and domestic flows. Platforms that allow users to find linkages between different kinds of data – including between socio-economic and crime data – are also a valuable tool in mapping and understanding flows and their effects.

Though their usage in the developing world still remains relatively limited, monitoring and mining of data in social media networks, predominantly Facebook and Twitter, yields new means to track qualitative data through quantitative measures. The private sector is using it to track public opinion and demand, New York City uses social media to give real time updates on metro transit and train delays, and various organisations are beginning to use it to track movements of violent actors like Boko Haram in Nigeria. Through analysing and algorithmic searches in Twitter, one can better understand the effects, movements, actions, and areas in which crime and violence emanate.

Mapping of information has dramatically increased in recent years. Organisations have begun finding new ways to record, monitor, and synthesize input using smart phones to analyze and understand the flows of vehicles, crime, robbery, murder and other crime and infrastructure management. Spott’*m*, iSafety, License Plate Tracking, Smart Policing Phone App, Take Action and more have contributed toward enhanced management of data, understanding of crime hot spots, and transporters of crime. Data visualisation of important traffic of goods can help significantly to support better understanding of the international and domestic flows of goods to and from different areas. The Igarape Institute<sup>7</sup> in Brazil have constructed multiple projects mapping crime, violence, and the

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<sup>7</sup> <https://igarape.org.br/en/>

flow of weapons, allowing cities to better understand how these movements affect changes, challenges, and development in the city.

Common across all of the city case studies is a second flow that appears to be of enormous consequence in almost every place: that of illegal drugs. In some cities, particularly the Latin American case studies, the impact of illicit drugs appears to be dramatic. This is particularly the case where the city is positioned at the intersection point of major drug-trafficking routes. However, in a number of the cities illicit drug flows and their impact on security constitute an important challenge, particularly in the promotion and sustaining of different forms of organised crime and violence.

Perhaps surprisingly, the regulation of transport flows in and between cities emerged as a key driver of insecurity in several case studies. In cities such as Lagos and Cape Town, for example, systems of private transport, and competition with public ones, are key sources of violence and instability. Such transport systems, as the next section will suggest, are also more widely connected to the movement of illicit goods and people.

Harder to isolate is the flow of ideas. Studies of each city have demonstrated that people are connected in ways that would have been unimaginable in the past. Ideas shape local organisations and ideologies. In Karachi, for example, extremist views are driven by a combination of Internet exchanges and the inflow of new migrants from elsewhere in Pakistan, a good example of how both old and new flows may combine to form insecurity (Hussain 2015). But ideas on forms of criminal activity, such as kidnapping, may also now move faster, and specific ideas around gang organisation, culture and identity easily and now rapidly cross borders.

The movement of illicit funds to the cities was highlighted in several cases as a source of insecurity. Illicit funds in such cases may distort local development, promote unneeded construction (often symbolised by the unfinished skeletons of buildings) and feed into local political party funding. This reinforces the conclusions of a recent study by the OECD on illicit financial flows in West Africa which demonstrated that far from finding their way to off-shore banking zones, much of the illicit money was invested locally, for, among other things, the sustaining of networks of politics and protection (OECD 2016).

In several cities researchers identified the movement and flow of counterfeit and other goods as a source of insecurity, or at least a threat to public health and safety. Firearms were also mentioned in several of the cases studies as causing instability and promoting an easy resort to violence.

#### *Flows and price*

The discussion on global flows is often reduced to a debate as how to measure their extent. Quantifying such flows is important, but not always essential. Much more critical is to understand the impact of the flows themselves (see the next section). Measuring the extent of a variety of flows is now often linked to seizures of that commodity, most pertinently in the case of illicit drugs. But it has long been understood that seizures do not provide an accurate reflection of the extent of flows: no seizures, for example, might mean that a flow is so well controlled, and law enforcement so corrupted, that nothing is seized.

A better alternative to measure the extent of different flows, particularly at local level, is to determine fluctuations in price for any commodity. Much more work is required at local level to acquire price data, but it is essential if city management is to understand more analytically the intersection between the global and the local. Local surveys of drug prices, for example, are a useful way to determine ongoing trends. Price also provides a way to judge whether a variety of regulatory or enforcement policies are having an effect: the higher the price rises the scarcer the goods, the lower the price the

greater their availability. There is much scope for innovation in this area, and a set of price data across a variety of illicit markets will in the long term be essential to defining effective counter-strategies. City administrations, which often conduct surveys on a variety of topics, are well placed to take the lead here. (Global Initiative and Dfid 2016)

## *2. Identifying connections between illicit flows and insecurity*

Identifying how different illicit flows are linked to insecurity is a critical part of the analysis suggested here. In many cases the link may be less obvious and will require a significant understanding of local markets and illicit flows.

Perhaps the most obvious example of the link between illicit flows and insecurity, including violence, is in relation to the control and marketing of illicit drugs. A wider literature has traced the connections between drug markets and violence (Andreas and Wallman 2009; Brownstein et al. 2000; Schneider 2013). The conclusions from these and other studies have applicability to other illicit markets too, and it is valuable to summarise the four key conclusions here:

- The movement of illicit commodities generally requires some form of ‘protection’. The provision of that protection generally entails the payment (or forced payment) to a group or groups with the capacity for violence. Those who provide such protection generally are not engaged in the entrepreneurial function of trafficking or moving the goods.
- While seldom done with any precision, measuring levels of violence related to the ‘protection’ function provides an indication of how well regulated illicit markets may be. Regular criminal assassinations, for example, provide an indication that markets remain relatively difficult to regulate.
- The degree to which new entrants in criminal markets are met with violence provides an indication of the level of control or criminal governance over any market. If there is evidence that new players can enter the market with ease, there is a strong chance that the market is not well established or controlled.
- Territorial control of ‘turf’ by criminal or political actors is often linked to strong control of individual markets in these areas. Strong territorial control provides the ability to levy protection payments for illicit activities that occur or cross the territory.

The four points above provide a measure of the extent of ‘criminal governance’ in any industry. Such governance often provides a direct assessment of the ability of the state to intervene in an illicit market.

The brief introduction here has focused on links between illicit markets/flows and insecurity. One of the key challenges remains collecting specific data that illustrates these links. Thus, for example, few if any police agencies in the developed or developing world collect information on gang violence, criminal ‘hits’ or vigilante killings. All three categories are of some importance in measuring the degree to which violence is associated with illicit markets and ‘criminal governance’. Where possible, cities may play an important role in fostering or supporting better data collection, including through the support of civil society. In addition, cities may usefully measure the degree to which their residents feel unsafe in different areas, using changes in that data as an indication of the success or failure of city-led policies.

### *Counting homicide in Karachi: a role for private providers*

One source of data for the city is Edhi, a private philanthropic institution that provides ambulance services across Karachi. This data provides detailed insight into the nature of violence in Karachi, including its distribution and the causes of death, which may not be as available in as comprehensive form from other sources (see UNODC 2014).

A The second important point to consider when identifying the connections between illicit flows and insecurity is that the nature of the relationships that become the fundamental drivers of events and actors. Indeed, relationships are at the very heart of this framework, situated at the intersections of each city's development and continuing security, between organised crime, corruption and terrorism, and between these phenomena and local developments.

City governments seldom map out social relations. Yet achieving safety requires a better understanding of the relations between different actors in a system. What has seldom been studied – and recent analyses emphasise as crucial – is the impact that external resource flows may have on individual groups with the propensity to cause either violence/insecurity or promote safety.

The degree to which social systems become conducive to violence, impacting on the life choices that may be open to individuals in such contexts, was highlighted above. Thus, an important part of identifying how illicit flows link to insecurity is to consider the position of the most vulnerable in society, most particularly women and children, but also unemployed youth or displaced populations living in slum-like conditions. These groups are more likely to be affected by insecurity, and have fewer resources to resist being affected. Interviews with female gang members, for example, illustrate how easily they are drawn into gangs, how difficult it is for them to leave, how important drug use becomes as a tool that prevents people escaping the power of gangs, and the vulnerabilities that women gang members face in relation to sexual exploitation. While the same is often true of men also, responses typically identify them as the main protagonists and target policies accordingly, while the involvement, role and impact on women is side-lined. These vulnerabilities may be created, for example, by the failure of education systems and family support mechanisms, in combination with poor policing of areas where gang members gather, and the lack of wider services such as health and social services. It also points to the critical role that community and religious organisations can play in drawing people away from violent and exploitative social organisations and relationships (see also *Changing the conditions that help to breed violence* on p. 21).

*How resources strengthen, weaken or fragment organisations*

Not all networks and groups are the same. An injection of resources has a very different impact on different groups, depending on how they are organised and what ideas (ideologies) hold them together. Drawing on the work of Paul Staniland (2014), three typologies of how external flows may impact upon local organisations can be identified:

1. Groups built on strong horizontal and vertical networks are likely to use lucrative resource flows for 'state-like' tasks including the use of violence.
2. Loosely organised groups where the flows of resources are dependent on the control of lower levels of the network (i.e. gang drug-distribution networks or taxi and transport associations) will use violence internal to secure resource flows. 'Disorganisation' is required at the bottom for the top to secure profits.
3. Groups built on weak networks of cooperation will face problems of indiscipline and then fragmentation as resource flows exacerbate pre-existing organisational divisions.

Staniland concludes that 'this variation shows that the focus should be less on resources themselves than on the social and institutional contexts into which they flow. An interactive approach that considers multiple factors is necessary instead of relying on easy platitudes about criminalisation and greed' (ibid.: 228).

### *3. Identifying factors in the system that can promote change*

Key factors may comprise: individuals, groups (and parts of groups); organisations (and parts of organisations); or states. They may be large or small, tightly or loosely connected and inclusive or exclusive in membership; they may engage in similar activities, or they may be specialised to undertake particular tasks. A factor, thus, may be a central business district towards which the systems that support such enterprises (such as, for instance, courier services, communications infrastructure and so on) converge, or it may be a port to and from which container ships arrive and depart in their voyages around the world.

It may be important in particular contexts to identify insecurity 'feedback loops' within a particular context. The levels of violence in a community, for instance, may become cyclical – in environments in which the use of coercive force by police officers further creates relationships of antagonism in the communities, the levels of violence experienced by that community will be heightened. By contrast, community-driven policing efforts may increase the overall health of the community, while further encouraging the integration of those people who may have previously been external to it, thus positively reinforcing the overall health and dynamism of the cohort in their responses to crime.

#### *The Fusion Project: creating a positive feedback loop*

The city of Cape Town has long been marred by the presence of deeply embedded gang structures. These gangs are hierarchically defined, disciplined, and have positioned themselves at the epicentre of a variety of organised criminal activities in the city. Their mantra of 'blood in, blood out'<sup>8</sup> makes the reform of individuals very difficult, and few projects have experienced successes. One project that stands above this, Fusion, attributes its success to the use of the same structures that define the gangs as a means of reform. The gang structure has been replicated, but the outputs have not – rather than deal drugs, participants tend vegetable gardens. What the project has found is that the outputs are of little concern – young men join gangs because they provide them with a space and place in which to define themselves. This is their power, and the basis for members' loyalty. Removing individuals to jail seems to have no effect, as the gangs may be strongest in prisons. What Fusion does, however, is break the cycle of violence by providing individuals with what they need – an understanding of who they are – beyond the socio-economic impetuosity to partake in criminal activity. The result is a startlingly simple yet powerful conclusion: gangsterism is for these young men a means by which to provide a narrative of themselves, and criminality itself is merely a means of expressing this narrative.<sup>9</sup>

### *4. Seeking out what builds resilience*

Resilience' is defined as an acquired capacity amongst people (as individuals or groups) to be able to resist external illicit influences or more effectively manage the costs that these influences may cause (see Zolli and Healy 2013). From a systems analytical perspective, a resilient system is one that can mitigate the effects of disruption through process of adaption or mitigation.

Mitigation is preventative, the ability of a system to respond to a threat in such a way as to decrease or eliminate that threat's potential. Adaption, on the other hand, speaks to a

<sup>8</sup> This refers where prospective gang members must commit murder in order to join, and where death is the only route out of the gang

<sup>9</sup> See <http://www.fusionmanenberg.org.za/>

system's ability to transform itself in response to or in anticipation of a threat or disruption. The latter is actively driven – the resilience of the system is a function of its ability to respond to threats and disruptions it had not anticipated. This can also be dealt with as a result of the system's structures and design.

A well-designed system is made stronger each time it faces a disruption, through its attempt to respond. In the context of the framework, the concept of 'resilient lives' is used to refer to the empowerment of individuals and communities to effectively engage with and adapt to both risks that are anticipated and those that are not, at the points at which they become harmful or disruptive.

#### *What drives crime in Mexico City?*

In all cities, crime, or at least certain types of crime, is concentrated in certain places. That is well demonstrated in a recent detailed study of crime in Mexico City that showed that in central and wealthier areas crime has in fact been declining, although overall levels for the city have increased. But what then drives the increases in crime in the city? The researchers showed that high degrees of social disorganisation or anomie are strongly associated with high levels of crime in neighbourhoods and slum areas in the city. Social disorganisation was measured through a series of proxy indicators for social inequality, the level of in-migration, the number of female-headed households and the number of bars/restaurants.

That reinforces older research which shows that, in a high proportion of crimes, victims and their perpetrators live near to each other, that crime is significantly higher in rental and large housing blocks, and that tight neighbourhood forms of organisation, particularly those that involve young men, are major contributing factors for crime. Again, the term social disorganisation suggests that these neighbourhoods are not *not* 'governed': in fact, tight forms of governance may be in place, with these being crime promoting rather than crime reducing.

The researchers urge the use of interventions that build the social organisation of the high-crime zones, suggesting that only using police interventions, which are seen as a first resort, will do little to bring down crime, and may cause greater distance between official and unofficial forms of governance. In such an argument building greater social organisation is a means to achieve higher levels of resilience within the community (see Vilalta and Muggah 2016).

#### ***The centrality of city planning***

City planning departments often stand at the nexus of multiple information flows. If city administrations are to fully understand and harness effective responses, the nature of such departments and the processes they manage must be geared up for the future. How flows impact upon city safety is often a feature of urban planning. Yet, city planning is often a function seen as separate from achieving safety, and much of the data around safety is not fed into or considered in planning processes.

City planning can for instance consider the physical infrastructure (for example, safety of public spaces), access to public services, and other issues that may be relevant from a security governance perspective<sup>10</sup>. Additionally, the planning process itself can be an opportunity to engage actors at various levels of government and responsibility with local communities to gather data for a better understanding of relevant risks and flows

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<sup>10</sup> Such work could, for instance, incorporate elements of crime prevention strategies – 'situational prevention' (reducing opportunities for crime to take place, often in terms of planning of physical space) as well as 'social prevention' (understanding the so-called factors, often socio-economic, that may drive increases in crime).

(and effects of policies), while promoting greater community ownership of the final plan.

The general focal areas for consideration and data collection that are presented here are only a broad framework. Cities must determine for themselves the key areas that must be researched. Nevertheless, it is suggested that for many cities research has focused only on local dynamics without a broader understanding of how flows connect to prevailing forms of violence and criminal governance. While Part II has suggested an approach to understanding holistically what is driving and resourcing forms of alternative governance, Part III examines the development of strategic responses based on the assessments proposed here.

## **PART III: SAFETY GOVERNANCE**

### ***Why 'safety governance'?***

'Safety governance' entails the *integration* of responses to achieve a safe environment. Safety governance is thus a multi-dimensional 'product', more than simply the management of safety, which is term that often applies to particular departments responsible for 'security' in many municipalities. Rather, it suggests a more holistic and strategic approach to the challenge of insecurity, and one that must involve a multiplicity of actors.

Safety governance also draws on the extensively used concept of 'good governance', which emphasises governance that is equitable, inclusive, participatory, transparent, accountable, efficient, effective, responsive, and adheres to the rule of law. Such principles are essential to realising a more wide-ranging understanding of safety. But safety governance implies more than just the process of governing, rather focusing on achieving a clear outcome: it seeks to enhance the well-being of people and societies through the appropriate management and allocation of safety resources across the city. This requires a strategic approach that both seeks to integrate different methods and the different spaces that make up the city, with safety being a core objective. The term safety governance (as opposed to the management of safety) also implies a recognition that achieving safety relies strongly on building inclusive cities. In that sense it is public policy – defined as the allocation of resources, services and opportunities – designed to facilitate and engender social harmony. Involving citizens in community policy-making improves information flow, accountability and due process; it gives a voice to those most affected by public policy (IDEA 2001). Such forms of inclusion are central to the concept of 'safety governance'.

### ***Inclusion as the central concept***

In the longer term securing cities in a globalising world will require every effort to be made in light of the requirement to ensure inclusion, particularly of the most marginalised and excluded. It is these people, generally seen to be disconnected from the benefits of the global economy, who are most likely to be linked to its dystopian side. No amount of enforcement will succeed in achieving their inclusion into the mainstream of city life, and law enforcement interventions may in fact serve to further exclude them.

The reality in many cities is that insecurity itself has become a point of division, with the middle and wealthier classes in particular insulating themselves from the poor, seen as the source of criminal activity. A 'security bubble' can be defined as a place within a city that has the resources and influence to isolate itself from the wider city with the objective of achieving greater levels of security. The term 'security' is used here deliberately, as the focus is on physical security, not wider integration or on achieving long-term safety. Security bubbles in the ten cities studied often have low levels of crime in comparison to those parts of the city inhabited by the poor and most marginalised. Achieving security in relatively well-demarcated spaces in the city with the appropriate resources is not hard to achieve: fences, armed guards and electronic monitoring make an effective security combination for localised spaces. This may even be important, at least in the short term, as it provides space for the growth of middle-class societies and productive activities. Yet, in the medium term, 'security bubbles' become guarded and inaccessible zones which prevent cities from achieving their full potential. The express objective of safety governance must be an integration of security bubbles within the wider city community, building longer-term social compacts around safety (see Hentschel 2015).

### *Housing and Homes*

A number of countries and cities in the developing world have rolled out large-scale urban housing projects in an attempt to bolster development, create communities in which residents feel safe, and increase access to socio-economic resources, transport, and services. In reviewing those paradigmatic examples which have been highlighted in the literature, it is important to note that the creation of housing does not itself guarantee increased levels of safety or development. Such housing projects may indeed become loci of criminal activity, facilitating new criminal networks and the creation of spaces that become ungovernable. It is critical to note, therefore, that the benefactors of such housing projects need to have some sense of ownership of their homes and the wider community around them, so as that the responsibility of creating safety within and around them is shared by both the residents and the local administration. Such projects require effective and honest dialogue, and cannot ignore larger socio-economic concerns in their development; it is important to house residents, but without effective education systems, large scale job-creation efforts, and reliable transportation services, such housing may not create sustainable forms of substantive development, and such houses may not become “homes”. (see Felbab-Brown 2016).

The core challenge for cities in a globalising world is to ensure through spatial planning, housing, the provision of services and a constant process of engagement that all citizens of the city are drawn as far as possible into its benefits. The argument that such policies will simply attract more people to already crowded cities is not sustainable: people will come anyway, and it is far better to build a safer community in which to receive newcomers by fostering a dynamic that focuses on peaceful coexistence in an environment where opportunities are available for even the most marginalised and excluded. The use of the framework of ‘safety governance’ that explicitly sees safety as the outcome of multiple inputs – in the areas of regulation, enforcement, engagement and resilience, all with the objective of building bridges between communities – provides an overarching strategic direction for city government.

### *Strategic turn-around in Lagos*

Prior to 2007, insecurity was a defining characteristic of Lagos. Brazen robberies and murder in the city were widely reported. Cases of murder by robbers, militias, touts at motor parks and other criminals were common. Foreign governments periodically issued statements warning their citizens about insecurity in the city, with attendant negative consequences for foreign investment and the country’s image within the international community.

High levels of crime in the city eroded safety and quality of life, economic activities and the legitimacy of the government. The problem of insecurity in the city was linked to intertwined problems such as high and rapidly growing population, sprawling slums, unemployment, poor infrastructure and services, inefficient security agencies and weak governance institutions. Achieving a safer Lagos seemed unattainable.

Babatunde Raji Fashola was sworn in as the governor of Lagos State on 29 May 2007. He explicitly recognised the impediment that insecurity constituted for the development of the mega-city and introduced a strategy to address the problem. Measures that turned out to be very significant for improved safety were the establishment of the Lagos State Security Trust Fund; reform of the criminal justice system; demolition of illegal structures to ‘recapture’ the ungoverned spaces within the city; improved infrastructure at motor parks and markets, many of which harboured criminals and gangs; strengthening local community crime watch groups; and improved transportation.

Most significant among the measures taken to improve security in Lagos was the establishment of the Lagos State Security Trust Fund in 2007. Legislation to this effect

was the first law that passed the state legislature under Fashola's tenure, underscoring the importance the governor attached to improving safety in Lagos. The Fund mobilised resources from both public and private sectors and allocated them to safety improvement programmes, including funding the police.

Other initiatives were the introduction of non-custodial sentences, including community service, probation and restitution; and the establishment of the Directorate for Citizens' Rights, a Public Interest Defence Team and the Citizens' Mediation Centre. In August 2012 a Road Traffic Law was enacted; its implementation was reported to have led to a decrease in 'armed robbery involving the use of motorcycle', a common crime in the city which had symbolised the inability of the authorities to bring safety.


Analysis of responses obtained from interviews with 58 operators and commuters at several markets and motor parks in the city for this framework indicated that security has improved in Lagos. The vast majority (91.4%) of the respondents said that security has improved in the city. Evidence of improvement provided included a decrease in crime, and frequent patrolling of the streets by the police. Over two thirds (70.7%) said that police performance has improved over the past five years.

The core lesson from the Lagos city experience is that improved security requires a multiplicity of legal, social and political measures, and partnership among diverse stakeholders (Alemika 2015).

### ***Safety governance strategies***

If any effort to address systemic insecurity to be successful, it will require a strategic approach that has buy-in from all of the relevant institutions and partners and that focuses on regulation, enforcement, engagement and resilience.

These four key components must be present in any strategic response to the challenges that have been outlined in the framework, and it is not sufficient to expect that a strong response in one area – for example, in enforcement – will be sufficient to achieve a new safety paradigm. Advancement must be made in a comprehensive way across all areas, each of these must be based on in-depth analytical work, and programmes and activities in each should seek to complement each other.



*Figure 4: The key elements of a safety governance strategy*

### **1. Regulation**

As the explanations in Parts I and II suggest, criminal activities and violence often result from a lack of regulation. Regulation is the means by which governance is applied to markets, both licit and illicit, to prevent or mitigate harm. Thus, for example, the failure to effectively manage and regulate the private commuter taxi industry in Cape Town and the motor parks in Lagos have had serious consequences for governance. The key objective of regulation by cities is to avoid the consequences of 'criminal governance'.

Regulation of a range of economic activities is one of the most effective long-term ways in which to prevent criminal activities and reduce the risk that they negatively affect safety. Regulatory activities in relation to illicit flows and markets can be divided into two broad categories:

- *The regulation of what would generally be regarded as legal activities but where the state has some obligation to manage these to prevent harm and criminal governance.* The improvement of the regulation of motorcycles in Lagos is an example. In other circumstances the regulation of markets in illicit alcohol (where the drinking of alcohol is not illegal) constitutes another case.
- *The regulation of sets of activities that have an impact on illegal markets.* This for example may relate to the regulation or certification of security company activities ('bouncers') in nightclubs where drugs are sold, or where violence is prevalent.

In both cases, regulation is about effectively governing aspects of an illicit or licit market to ensure that criminal governance, with its associated violence and price distortions, does not prevail.

The markets that are the most difficult to regulate are those that were not regulated in the beginning, making later state intervention particularly difficult to manage. That requires sensitive but firm action by state actors. It cannot only be an enforcement action, but also requires a range of other economic incentives. This suggests that regulation may be most effectively implemented when market actors are relatively disorganised and in competition with each other. Effective market regulation, particularly when state capacities are weak, may often be as much about timing as capacity.

It should be emphasised that city governments have multiple regulatory powers related to crime prevention and control. These are usually administered by specific departments within municipalities without recourse to a wider strategy. Regulation in the following areas have enormous importance for the interface between external flows and local forms of governance:

- traffic flows, vehicular access and licensing of drivers, as in the case of responses to armed robbery in Lagos described above;
- business permits, for example, for hotels and other forms of accommodation that might serve as venues for sex trafficking;
- liquor licences, given the role that the consumption of alcohol in certain circumstances may be linked to violence;
- housing allocation, particularly if controlled or influenced by gang or organised-crime interests;
- private transport, including where it can be used and who controls its governing associations;

- building permits, particularly in cases where construction is undertaken with the objective of laundering illicit funds.

These are only some examples, and the role and functions of city government may vary in different places. These processes of regulation, such as the issuing of permits or licences, are often targeted by organised crime. In almost all cities in the developing world licensing systems suffer from some level of corruption. Such jobs are often literally 'for sale' given that they may generate extensive private incomes. Corruption, as a result of weaker governance systems often manifests itself in procurement manipulations, thus diverting much needed resources from development. This may result in lower quality of the products or services procured and in inflated prices to be paid by the taxpayers. Ensuring transparency, accountability and ultimately the integrity of these processes should be an urgent focus of city leaders: effectively applied, they constitute one of the most effective local tools against criminal governance.

## **2. Enforcement**

Enforcement is often considered to be the 'silver bullet' that will solve crime and violence problems. An over-reliance on policing strategies, however, by failing to address root causes of local inequalities, marginalisation or exclusion, have been shown to exacerbate rather than mitigate the drivers undermining safety. Enforcement is an important component of a response, but one that should be viewed as a specific instrument in a holistic strategy that includes longer-term prevention initiatives addressing root causes of crime at individual, community and national level. At the same time, if conducted within the framework of the rule of law and with an emphasis on building community support, enforcement may serve as one of the most important elements in bridging relations between people and police and between different parts of a divided city. Jill Leovy's study of the failure of police enforcement during gang violence in South Central Los Angeles concludes:

*If every murder and every serious assault against a black man on the streets were investigated with Skagg's [a police detective] ceaseless vigor and determination – investigated as if one's own child were the victim, or as if we, as a society, could not bear to lose these people – conditions would have been different. If the system had for years produced the very high clearance rates that Skaggs was sure was possible ... the violence would not have been so routine. The victims would not have been so anonymous, and ... might have not died the nearly invisible, commonplace way in why [they] did. (Leovy 2015: 306)*

City governments with weak capacity often find enforcement their most difficult task. That is because cities in the developing world generally have to rely on national or regional police to perform the enforcement function and often have little way to influence policing priorities and objectives. All ten cities studied for the production of this framework did not control policing resources. In some cases, city leaders specifically state that policing is not in their jurisdiction and so they are unable to influence most aspects of safety. This is an approach that is designed to fail: lack of safety is blamed on city governments even if their responsibilities and resources are limited in this area. Also, enforcement must be part of any overall strategy to ensure safety. City governments therefore appear to rely on three strategies to achieve this:

- Cities, often by *stretching the definition of their functions*, most notably that in respect of 'crime prevention', appoint their own enforcement or quasi-enforcement agencies. This includes the use for example of civilians or private security personal to patrol streets or regulate parking.

- Mayors apply *direct political pressure* at the highest levels of government to ensure that national or federal resources are deployed to respond to crime. This is easier in capital cities or those that generate considerable amounts of economic activity (Karachi is a good example here), but is much more difficult for middle-level cities, particularly if they are controlled by political interests other than those of national government.
- City governments *establish joint fora* with the national or regional police where they seek to set priorities, and in some cases monitor them. These are often relatively weak in their ability to influence police actions. Nevertheless, they are critical in achieving a degree of coordination between city and police actions.

Many cities may use all three of the alternatives outlined here. Most important here is to align city actions, for example, cleaning up a blighted part of the city, with police deployments to ensure that progress is retained. The case studies suggest that written agreements, plans or 'work programmes' between national and city authorities may at least provide a more formal basis for cooperation that may be measured.

### *The Khayelitsha Commission in Cape Town*

When city governments do not have direct control over the police they may resort to a variety of ways to bring pressure for reform. A good example of this is the Khayelitsha Commission in Cape Town.

From 2003 to 2012 community-based organisations in Khayelitsha held repeated protests as to the poor state of policing. They were supported in their efforts by a vocal and highly organised civil society sector, led by the Social Justice Coalition (SJC). Levels of crime were of great concern to residents: serious crimes such as murder and attempted murder had increased greatly since 2009 and most property crimes were not reported due to a lack of trust by the community in the police. Between 2001 and 2009 the number of criminal cases opened against the police increased by 363%. The SJC also documented cases illustrating serious systemic failures in the functioning of the criminal justice system that led to a loss of public trust in the police.

In August 2012 the premier of the Western Cape established the Khayelitsha Commission to investigate and recommend improvements to achieve greater safety. The Commission, led by two respected figures, one of whom was a former Constitutional Court judge, opened offices in Khayelitsha, inviting members of the public to make statements regarding the safety situation. Extensive evidence was heard over a number of months. The commissioners submitted a final report in August 2014 that contained detailed recommendations on both police reform and the role of the city authorities. The report is seen as a landmark in the evolving debate on improving safety for some of Cape Town's poorest and most marginalised residents. A process is now under way to implement the recommendations.

In several of the cities studied (Karachi, Kingston, Cape Town and others) military resources have been used to police the cities. This happened after protest from city leaders that all other alternatives have failed. Using the military is a last resort and, while it allows situations to stabilise, it does not solve the long-term problems of safety. In extreme cases, such as Karachi, military deployments are likely to retain a degree of permanence that was not envisaged at the outset. If militaries are to be deployed, city governments must emphasise that these are 'stabilisation operations' and urge governments to strengthen policing capacities.

None of the explanation above solves the essential conundrum for city leaders as to their weak hold over law-enforcement capacity. This is unlikely to change in the near future, as policing will remain centralised, if perhaps more responsive to local needs in some countries and cities. Yet, there may be advantages in cities not having access to policing resources: it focuses city efforts on longer-term violence and crime prevention programmes, which are often neglected – including by central governments. It is for this reason that some of the most innovative crime-prevention initiatives have often emerged in cities without their own police.

Critical in this regard may be initiatives that increase the capacity for human surveillance in the absence of sufficient or effective policing resources. Systems that promote 'crowd-sourcing' – the deployment of large numbers of people, often linked together with communication technology, who perform other tasks (such as parking regulation, static guarding, or neighbourhood watches) but who provide a network of surveillance, have proved effective. In short, in the absence of effective control over policing resources, the best response for city officials may be to build wider networks that inform policing and engage local communities, often through the use of currently appointed city personnel or through partnerships with other actors, in order to channel policing resources where they are most required.

### **3. Engagement**

Engagement and communication remain among the most important tools that city officials may have in fostering inclusive, resilient and law-abiding societies. Too often, however, particularly in the case of marginalised and excluded groups, cities engage and communicate poorly, and pay the price later when projects have been built and systems implemented. Incorporating marginalised groups into decision-making processes and reaching out to people beyond identified ‘community leaders’ remains a key challenge in all cities. Genuine engagement and communication that allows for feedback remains essential, but is challenging in often fragile and fragmented environments.

Such processes of engagement can never be separated from the rough-and-tumble of politics in divided cities.. Development agency exhortations that crime and violence reduction strategies should be de-politicised are almost impossible to realise on the ground. As a recent comparative study of three cities in Colombia have shown, the response to high levels of violence is deeply shaped by politics – it is not and cannot be a neutral process: responses are ‘inherently political because they can either preserve or reshape the distribution of resources and power in [cities] historically characterised by socio-economic inequality and exclusionary politics’ (Moncada 2016). The role of powerful business interests and their alignment with reforming political actors appears to be a critical ingredient for success.

#### *Business, safety and politics in three Colombian cities*

In a path-breaking recent study of urban violence strategies in Bogota, Cali and Medellín, Eduardo Moncada concluded that the link between dominant business interests and city governments was crucial for success. Strong linkages between local public and private sectors facilitate the sharing of resources and information, build trust and help resolve conflict. In Bogotá and Medellín, strong public–private linkages facilitated advanced participatory responses to urban violence. There was extensive collaboration between local government and business actors which generated wider domestic and international support for tackling inequality and deepening local political participation. But, where such linkages were absent, as in Cali, efforts to respond to violence not only failed but degenerated into political conflict that eroded support for a redistribution of resources and a participatory and more inclusive process (see Moncada 2016).

Such processes of engagement also raise important questions as to who should be engaged, leading to often difficult decisions as to the requirement to negotiate with those, such as local strong men or gang leaders, who have themselves been engaged in crime and violence. For example, a negotiated gang truce in El Salvador did dramatically bring down levels of violence, only for gang-related conflict to spiral again when the truce fell apart. The gangs had used the period of ‘peace’ to reorganise and rearm, highlighting that engagement and negotiation must always be part of a wider strategy of resilience building. The role of women as change leaders, pacifiers and advocates has been much touted as a response to the growth of violent extremism and conflict, though the evidence basis and learning required to engage them remains sparse and highly context specific.

In short, there are no easy answers and it is not possible to reduce processes of engagement to apolitical, neutral and technical discussions around safety. The way forward in each case must be carefully judged and implemented with an understanding of the political dynamics standing at the centre, rather than that being pushed off to one the side as outside the scope of a ‘technocratic’ focus on crime prevention.

*Structured engagement: the history of Business Improvement Districts*

Business Improvement Districts are known by various names, such as Community, Special, Public, Downtown or Neighbourhood Improvement Districts, to name a few. Originating in Canada in the late 1960s, they have been adopted and adapted in a range of countries since then, including for instance, the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, South Africa, Serbia, Albania and Jamaica (Hoyt, 2006). Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) are non-profit, public-private corporations, which generate a private form of taxation collected from property owners in a defined geographical (urban) space to supplement or top-up local government services.

The revenue generated – ring-fenced for BID use and spaces only – is used to improve the BID space (usually only a few city blocks in size) so as to attract private investment and tourism. Some of the ‘improvements’ may include public safety interventions, providing additional social services, maintaining streets through cleansing and lighting and controlling traffic and parking. These additional services may be outsourced to a variety of companies (such as private security companies and/or cleaning staff). This is because BIDs are primarily responsible for the day-to-day, street-level management of their spaces. In this regard, they are generally held accountable to local government through having to report on activities and spending. However, the nature of this relationship is dependent on context.

The attraction of BIDs lies in their economic benefits – they are considered to be an effective means by which local governments and/or local (business) communities benefit from the delivery of top-up services by drawing in public and private resources inherent in that space. Businesses stand to gain from this through an improved urban space. Likewise, local governments in the face of economic deficits, stand to gain by retaining their political control and public image through harnessing private sector resources to boost levels of service delivery. They also avoid the ‘free rider’ problem. This is because, once the majority of ratepayers in the proposed BID vote for its establishment, it is compulsory for *all* in that District to pay the top-up rates whether or not they opposed its establishment. They are subject to the same penalties imposed for non-payment of regular property rates. Consequently, scholars are generally in agreement that the establishment of BIDs is due to the politico-economic benefits they yield, hence the attractiveness to both local governments and the private sector.

Politics, as the saying goes, is also about effective communication. Yet the challenge of effective communication on the issue of safety in the communications age has barely been broached. Perhaps the very first challenge in the policy-making community is to recognise the extent to which illicit markets and ‘deviant’ groups are enabled by social media. Cities, given their populations and their connectedness, are at the forefront of these trends. Many senior city officials and policy makers, however, are from another generation, not always aware of the extent of the cross-over between the illicit and the burgeoning communications opportunities offered by cyberspace. The review of initiatives both in and external to the ten city case studies suggests that responses are generally experimental and fragmented.

*Social media*

While communication responses to illicit activities remain in their infancy, and no real cases of success are yet available, enough is known from these to at least provide a set of broad guidance principles and ideas as to what may work (see Reitano and Trabulsi 2016). Critically, social media messaging is often reactive to an established ‘message’ from illicit market or violent actors. What is required is to create a new narrative of inclusion rather than one that is simply reactive to an already established one. If they are to be successful, city social media campaigns have to sustain a communication

campaign focused on inclusion and belonging and the promotion of narratives of peace and engagement.

Social media is also by definition interactive. Cities cannot only broadcast, but must also respond. Dedicated and skilled resources are required to achieve that. Social media campaigns must be linked to actions on the ground, particularly if they seek to build a narrative that city governments are making a difference. Creating a social media campaign with no capacity to deliver where people engage with city institutions will weaken the bonds between the city and, in particular, young people.

The use of social media platforms that are driven by local users but facilitated by city officials offers a chance to create new narratives around safety – and ones that are aimed at providing practical solutions. For example, social media exchanges which report where violence is occurring so that people can avoid those places is of use both to ordinary citizens and to city and enforcement officials. At the same time, social media networks that record and report local corruption have been shown to be effective. There is thus an enormous amount of scope to develop new programmes in this respect. Adequate mechanisms of protection for persons who report corruption in good faith can be also instrumental to strengthening the accountability in the system and serve as a deterrence of would-be perpetrators.

In extreme cases city officials may focus on shutting down social media users that advocate violence or criminal activities on-line. That will require the support of the private sector, and may potentially involve an approach to the justice system, depending on the circumstances. But ending abusive or violent messaging carries an important symbolic message in its own right. In fact, the goal may be not to shut down voices or channels, but to open space for new and multiple channels which allow for new competing voices.

In summary, to communicate effectively cities increasingly require a social media presence to both monitor information and create a new narrative. At the same time, city governments may gain enormous credibility from strengthening civic engagement by initiating or 'hosting' social media campaigns that report on violence, corruption and inefficiencies with service delivery. What is essential, however, is to ensure that there is concrete capacity to deliver effective responses on the ground. Such initiatives may well be part of what Moisés Naím has termed 'the coming surge of political innovation' (2013: 243), which will be essential if cities are to catch up and harness the tools that many of their residents now communicate with and through.

#### **4. Resilience**

Part II of the framework showed the importance of analysis on how external flows shifted or distorted local behaviours. Under the heading of 'resilience,' communities and/or groups of people within the city that are identified as being particularly vulnerable may be strengthened in relation to the impact of external illicit flows. '

A recent study of urban resilience draws similar conclusions to the city studies, by identifying both negative and positive forms of resilience. Positive resilience relies on strong, cooperative relationships between the state, community, and between different actors – business, civil society and the police for example. Negative resilience occurs when violent entrepreneurs – or alternative providers of protection – impose their own form of justice, security and livelihoods. This often happens in informal neighbourhoods where property rights are vague or contested and where the community is fragmented (USAID and MIT 2012).

Relationships of resilience can be illustrated using a simple matrix, where the upper right quadrant is the objective that city authorities and community leaders must strive for:




Figure 5: Negative and positive resilience

Activities that focus on improving both strong state connections and greater community resilience include a wide range of work, both with individuals and groups of people and communities. Resilience-building activities provide a host of opportunities and ideas for intervention. They can generally be divided into five broad categories:

- Activities that target particular vulnerable groups by *removing or placing them at a distance* from the dangers associated with some criminal activities or areas of insecurity. School sports or outdoor programmes for young men that draw them away from the influence of gangs constitute one such example.
- Processes that *draw on the inner resilience of established groups to influence* others who may be drawn into illicit activities. The use of women's or mothers' groups to influence the behaviour of men or boys is an example. One caution needs to be observed, however, in assuming that 'traditional' leaders will have the capacity to engage with youth, as significant generation gaps have been observed.
- Interventions that *bolster the intervention capacities of communities* themselves, such as in the case of stand-by negotiators, 'peace monitors' or other forms of community responses to violence and security.
- Investments in *employment creation and training to divert* vulnerable groups from insecure areas or illicit activities. Large-scale work and/or vocational training would fit this category, but the emphasis should be on the creation of employment that allows for social advancement, rather than just menial labour.
- Initiatives that seek to expose, '*name and shame*' those engaged in illicit activities in communities. Such approaches are seldom possible without wider law enforcement and community support and must provide a pathway for the reintegration of groups or individuals into the community.

Resilience programmes work best when conducted across several of these categories at once, reinforcing the overall objective in multiple ways.

*Kingston: building resilience to face the future*

The 2010 operation in Tivoli Gardens by the security forces to apprehend Christopher 'Dudus' Coke was a very frightening experience for citizens who live in West Kingston. The Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP) played an instrumental role in the healing process by organising emergency counselling sessions and therapeutic trips for many of these traumatised residents. The programme is also playing an active role in helping to empower citizens in inner-city communities so that they become less dependent on criminals. In doing so, the CSJP is helping to reintroduce the presence of the state in order to improve citizens' socio-economic conditions and prevent criminal domination (see Marston 2015).

Government agencies and institutions can be poorly placed to develop sustainable strategies of resilience for communities. Religious groups and organisations, social and local groups, and extended family and ethnic associations provide much more viable opportunities for doing so. The use of such interlocutors carries some risks given that few such organisations are completely neutral in the highly politicised environments that often characterise insecure cities.

*Manila: focusing on safety is a form of resilience*

The Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD) is a widely respected civil society body that organises informal settler communities into housing cooperatives. IPD does not purchase or donate land to informal settlers, but rather works within existing government programmes. IPD recognises that few informal settlers use government housing programmes because of a lack of trust in the government, lack of money to purchase land and housing, and poor programme design. To counter these challenges, IPD coordinates these housing cooperatives to renegotiate loan agreements that are more favourable to the cooperative. Standard loan agreements offered by the Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC) are between individual families and the SHFC, do not allow economic activities on the property, and require a multitude of corrupt payments. The revised agreements are between the housing cooperative and the SHFC, allow economic activities on the property, and try to limit corrupt payments.

The first revision creates an agreement between the housing cooperative and the SHFC, and in doing so creates a middleman and level of protection for the family in the form of the cooperative. Working as a cooperative gives greater power to families than negotiating with the SHFC individually. Additionally, payments and other legalities are now the responsibility of the cooperative and not individual families. The second revision allows for economic activities within the cooperative. The third revision requires all documents and regulations for land purchase, building permits, zoning and others, to be presented together at the beginning of any loan, contract, or project. Currently, regulations are presented in a series. In other words, one regulation is shown, and when it is met the next is divulged. This allows government officials to demand multiple bribes or unauthorised facilitation payments to move the project forward. To counter these corrupt practices, the cooperatives are requesting transparency within the programme(s) by having everything presented in advance. Unfortunately, however, with the IPD project connected to a government programme it has not taken into account that informal settlers cannot afford to pay cash for their homes, and it does not address the issue of the surrounding environment of increased crime, corruption and vulnerability. IDP is trying to renegotiate government programmes to benefit informal settlers. However, the issues of jobs, lack of money to make loan payments, and the surrounding environment that often pulls an individual or family down into crime, need to be addressed (see Guth 2015).

What criteria might be applied to people or groups who partner with (or are funded by) cities to engage in resilience building activities? Five emerged from the city studies:

- They must contain credible leadership.
- They must not have been involved in illicit activities, although some exceptions should be considered in specific case, such as in using reformed gang members or extremists.
- They should not carry a specific political character, although again there are possible exceptions to this where political organisations have great legitimacy in local or city-wide communities.
- They should explicitly exclude the use of violence and be focused on the peaceful resolution of disputes through engagement and negotiation.
- They should not be set up in direct competition with criminal or violent extremist groups.

It should be emphasised that resilience-building activities take time. They are likely to be much more effective if conducted in conjunction with those aimed at regulation, communication and enforcement. Resilience-building activities are vulnerable to subversion by illicit actors, precisely because they may often target community support for individuals, and so will seldom succeed on their own.

### ***Prerequisites for success***

The previous sections have shown just how challenging it is for cities to respond to the insecurities that characterise the interaction between local conditions and global flows. How they do so, however, will define their success in an evolving world. The challenge is enormous: the case studies demonstrate the difficulties of achieving effective solutions in complex and contested social and political spaces. At the same time, they suggest an important set of prerequisites for success. While these depend on the particular local environment present in each city, they also represent a common set of principles around which city-based interventions could be framed. The framework builds on the foundational principles that were identified in the 2002 UN Guidelines for the prevention of crime (UNODC and ICPC 2002). In particular, these underscored the importance of recognising crime prevention as a process, rather than as a one off “magic bullet” which would achieve success overnight.

In terms of implementation, and drawing on the foundation of the 2002 UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, the framework highlights the following basic principles:

- *Government leadership*: all levels of government should play a leadership role in developing effective and humane crime prevention strategies;
- *Socio-economic development and inclusion*: Crime prevention considerations should be built into all relevant social and economic policies and programmes, including those addressing employment, education, health, housing and urban planning.
- *Cooperation and partnerships*: Given the wide ranging nature of the causes of crime and the skills and responsibilities to address them, cooperation and partnership between ministries and between authorities, community organizations, non-governmental organizations, the business sector and private citizens is needed.
- *Sustainability, accountability and resources*: Achieving safety is not possible without an investment of sustainable resources. There should be clear accountability for funding, implementation and evaluation of programmes, policies and initiatives

- *Knowledge base and monitoring:* strategies, policies and programmes to address crime and violence in cities, should be based on a broad, multidisciplinary foundation of knowledge about crime problems, their causes and promising and proven practices;
- *Promote a culture of lawfulness and human rights:* The focus on replacing 'criminal governance' with legitimate governance lies at the heart of the framework. Doing so must rely on building a culture of lawfulness that is based on human rights principles and the promotion of the rule of law.
- *Differentiated:* Programmes that are consultative and respectful of the conditions, resources and needs of local communities. This includes taking into account the different needs of women and men and the special requirements of vulnerable groups.
- *Interdependency:* National crime prevention diagnosis and strategies should, where appropriate, take account of links between local criminal problems and international organized crime;

In addition, to these basic principles, the framework suggests the following prerequisites for success:

- *A mix of practical and symbolic actions:* While it is accepted that practical outcomes must be achieved, symbolic measures may be no less important. These include the activities of individual leaders in promoting behaviours commensurate with high levels of integrity and the rule of law.
- *Innovation and experimentation:* In the complex environment in which most cities find themselves, many policy responses will by definition be locally contingent. That provides important space for innovation and experimentation.

## Epilogue

This report has attempted to provide a framework for urban policy makers and practitioners who work with cities and urban communities. In doing so, its aim has not to provide a definitive or prescriptive account of security governance at an urban level, but rather to provide analytical elements and case examples that may prove helpful in understanding the connections between local/city conditions and external influences, and how plans might be developed to address these and build resilience. As such, the security governance approach that this framework suggests should be considered as something that policymakers can be built on as they identify and share innovative approaches suited to the particular circumstances in their cities and countries.

One of the key elements that came across in the studies and meetings that contributed to this framework is the importance of establishing effective and locally-suited mechanisms for cooperation – between different agencies and levels of government, as well as between community groups and state actors. These mechanisms help build trust between different actors (for example, those with responsibility for security and urban planning respectively), and can become a platform for communication allowing for more comprehensive understanding of the system of factors that affect local security conditions, as well as of potential points of resilience to risks and threats.

Recent events in sustainable development have only served to reinforce this movement towards a more comprehensive and coherent policy approach. The 2030 Agenda, for instance, explicitly recognises the interdependence and interconnectedness of policy areas, with its 17 Goals and 169 targets forming a network of different factors that contribute to the development of communities, regions and countries. Work of local and national governments, international organisations, and civil society actors should consider security governance within the context of this larger interconnected framework.

As a growing majority of the world's population become city-dwellers, the impact of transnational issues will increasingly be felt within an urban context. Importantly, most of this growth will occur outside of the developed nations. Urban policies and programmes will therefore need to take into account an ever larger number of external flows with varying levels of resources available to both understand and deal with them. For this reason, the basic principles highlighted in the previous section of this framework can be helpful – by allowing urban actors to better identify areas of need in their respective contexts, as well areas where innovative and pragmatic policy approaches can be identified and shared with others.

As the world reaffirms its commitment to sustainable development in both the Sustainable Development Goals and the New Urban Agenda, there is political momentum behind efforts to address insecurity and improve governance and living conditions within cities and urban communities. In the coming years, it is essential for development and urban actors to make the most of this political engagement in order to develop policies, understanding and networks of cooperation in order to better the lives of the people they serve.

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